

## Message Text

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FOR EAGLEBURGER FROM S/PRS - BROWN

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SUBJECT: PRESS ITEMS OF INTEREST, SEPTEMBER 24:

NO. 46

1. JERALD TERHORST, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, SEPT. 24:

"IAN SMITH TRIES TO STOP THE DELUGE"

"WASHINGTON - IAN D. SMITH IS IN A FAR-AWAY PLACE.

NOW, SUDDENLY AND SHARPLY, THE RUDDY PRIME MINISTER AND THAT  
AFRICAN HUNK OF OLD BRITISH EMPIRE HAVE BECOME EMBROILED  
IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF JERRY FORD AND JIMMY  
CARTER.

"HOW THEY DEAL WITH SMITH'S RHODESIA COULD MAKE THE DIFF-  
ERENCE BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES ON A  
CONTINENT LONG IGNORED AND MALIGNED BY WASHINGTON POLICY-  
MAKERS. AND THAT, IN TURN, COULD TRIGGER THE NEXT CON-  
FRONTATION WITH MOSCOW OR WITH THE THIRD WORLD OF NONWHITE  
NATIONS.

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"ELEVEN YEARS AGO, SMITH AND HIS RHODESIAN FRONT PARTY  
SHOCKED HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN LONDON BY PULLING  
RHODESIA OUT OF THE COMMONWEALTH RATHER THAN YIELD POLITICAL  
POWER TO THE COUNTRY'S OVERWHELMING BLACK MAJORITY.

FIRST BRITONS AND THEN THE UNITED NATIONS REACTED TO THE 'ILLEGAL RACIST MINORITY REGIME' OF IAN SMITH BY IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. THE UN RESOLUTION CALLED ON MEMBER COUNTRIES TO REFRAIN FROM SHIPPING OR SELLING OIL AND ARMS TO RHODESIA OR BUYING ITS MAJOR PRODUCTS - ASBESTOS, IRON, SUGAR, TOBACCO, MEAT, HIDES AND SKINS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CHROME, WHICH THE US HAS BOUGHT FROM RHODESIA INSTEAD OF RUSSIA, AMERICA HAS HONORED THE UN DECREE.

"EVER SINCE 1965, SMITH'S RHODESIA HAS SUCCESSFULLY THUMBED ITS NOSE AT ALMOST EVERYBODY, LEARNING HOW TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT, OBTAINING WEAPONS AND OIL THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA - THE OTHER WHITE MINORITY POWER ON THE CONTINENT - AND WORKING OUT TACIT SHIPPING DEALS WITH THE OLD PORTUGUESE MASTERS OF MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA. BUT BLACK NATIONALISM WAS NOT TO BE DENIED THERE, AND IT IS NOT TO BE DENIED IN RHODESIA. AND SO IN 1976, SMITH'S GOVERNMENT FINDS ITSELF BACKING AGAINST THE WALL, FACING THE UPCOMING RAINY SEASON WITH THE DIRE PROSPECT OF ARMED REBELLION BY RHODESIA'S 6 MILLION BLACKS AGAINST ITS 270,000 WHITES.

"IT WAS TO FORESTALL THAT KIND OF RACIAL BLOODBATH THAT HENRY KISSINGER BEGAN HIS 11TH HOUR DIPLOMATIC MISSION LAST WEEK IN THE MIDST OF THE FORD-CARTER CAMPAIGN FOR THE WHITE HOUSE. AND IT WAS THE HOPE OF FINDING SOME FACE-SAVING COMPROMISE THAT SMITH AND HIS CABINET HAVE MADE COVERT OVERTURES THROUGH PRIVATE THIRD PARTIES TO THE CAMPS OF BOTH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. THE SMITH OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO PREVENT EVENTUAL TRANSITION OF POWER TO THE BLACK MAJORITY - A PRINCIPAL ENUNCIATED BY KISSINGER IN THE NAME OF THE US. SMITH KNOWS THAT BY ARMED MIGHT OR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THE BLACKS ARE DESTINED TO TAKE OVER. WHAT SMITH WANTS IS TIME, A COMMODITY HE HOPES HE CAN ACQUIRE THROUGH WASHINGTON, TIME TO AVERT POLITICAL SUICIDE. WILL THE NEXT PRESIDENT UNCLASSIFIED

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- MR. FORD OR MR. CARTER - HELP?

"IT IS IN THE PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE THAT THE RHODESIAN ISSUE HAS ENTERED THE CAMPAIGN, VERY MUCH BEHIND THE SCENE AND IN AN UNUSUAL MANNER.

"WHILE DETAILS CANNOT BE DIVULGED HERE, IT CAN BE SAID AUTHORITATIVELY THAT ONE OF SMITH'S CLOSEST CONFIDANTS, A HIGH RHODESIAN OFFICIAL, HAS INTERCEDED AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR DIRECT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF PRESIDENT FORD IN WORKING OUT SOME ACCOMMODATION. THE REQUEST WAS TRANSMITTED IN THE LETTER HAND-DELIVERED TO THE WHITE HOUSE BY A PRIVATE CITIZEN RECENTLY BACK FROM SALISBURY.

A SIMILAR APPROACH FOR SUPPORT IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO JIMMY CARTER THROUGH ANOTHER PRIVATE EMMISARY. HOWEVER, REP. ANDREW YOUNG, THE GEORGIA DEMOCRAT WHO HAS COUNSELED CARTER ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, TOLD ME HE IS UNAWARE OF A RHODESIAN BID TO THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE.

"WHAT SMITH SEEKS IS SUPPORT FROM FORD OR CARTER, OR BOTH, FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME THAN THE TWO YEARS THAT BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS SEEM WILLING TO GRANT RHODESIA FOR THE TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE. SMITH ALSO WANTS GUARANTEES OF FINANCIAL REIMBURSEMENT TO WHITES FOR FARMS, BUSINESSES, AND OTHER PROPERTY, AND AN AMERICAN-BRITISH AGREEMENT TO WORK FOR AN END TO THE UN SANCTIONS THAT HAVE THROTTLED THE COUNTRY'S GROWTH. IT IS A DESPERATE BID TO AVERT A WHIT FLIGHT FROM RHODESIAOR WHAT ONE AMERICAN OFFICIAL GRIMLY FORSEES AS 'CUSTER'S LAST STAND.'

"FORD PLAINLY IS TEMPTED TO TURN ANY RHODESIAN COMPROMISE INTO A CAMPAIGN ASSET. INDEED, HE IS BEING PRESSURED TO EXPLOIT IT PRECISELY FOR THAT PRUPOSE IN COMING DAYS. THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AREN'T QUITE SO AVAILABLE TO JIMMY CARTER, BUT HE CERTAINLY WILL JUMP ON FORD IF THE RHODESIAN CRISIS TURNS INTO THE KIND OF BLOODY SCENE THAT CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH WARNED AGAINST THE OTHER DAY.

"IT MAY BE TOO LATE FOR ANY SPECIAL FORD OR CARTER MOVE, DESPITE THE LURE OF THE POLITICS OF PEACEMAKING. IT MAY UNCLASSIFIED

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BE THEPOLITICS OFPEACEMAKING. IT MAY BE NAIVE OF THESMITH REGIMETOTHINK IT COULD BE DONE. BUT THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE RHODESIAN ISSUE IS GOING TO CREATE A STIR IN THIS CAMPAIGN, QUITE LOGICALLY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE BETWEEN THE CANDIDATES ON OCT. 6."

2. MARY MCGRORY, BALTIMORE SUN, SEPT. 24: "US NEEDS EMPATHY FOR AFRICA'S BLACKS"

"WASHINGTON -- THE THING THAT WOULD PROBABLY WIN US THE MOST HEARTS AND MINDS IN BLACK AFRICA WOULD BE TO RECOGNIZE THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA - THE ONE WE TRIED TO KEEP FROM OFFICE.

"THE FORD ADMINISTRATION SEEMS DISINCLINED TO SUCH A SIMPLE STEP AND HAS YET TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT WE WILL NOT VETO ANGOLA'S ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

"INSTEAD, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS DROPPED THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE SKIES ONCE AGAIN AND DAZZLE THE WORLD WITH A NEWS DISPLAY OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY.

-THE KISSINGER MISSION HAS SOME SUPPORT ON CAPITAL HILL, PARTICULARLY AMONG REPUBLICANS WHO DREAM OF A PRE-ELECTION COUP THAT WILL STIFFEN GERALD FORD'S CLAIMS OF SUPERIOR FOREIGN POLICY 'EXPERIENCE.' SENATOR DICK CLARK, (D., IOWA) WHO LED THE FIGHT AGAINST THE ANGOLA INTERVENTION, WAS SO PLEASED TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES PAYING ATTENTION TO AFRICA AT LAST, 'EVEN IF IT'S FOR THE WRONG REASONS,' THAT HE GAVE HIS BLESSING TO THE EXPEDITION.

"BUT IT'S PRETTY OBVIOUS THAT A MUCH BETTER UNITED STATES EMISSARY TO AFRICA WOULD BE REPRESENTATIVE ANDREW YOUNG NOT BECAUSE HE'S JIMMY CARTER'S MAN, BUT BECAUSE HE KNOWS WHAT IT'S ALL ABOUT IN SOWETO.

"MR. YOUNG, IS FOR ONE THING, WITHOUT MR. KISSINGER'S HANG-UP ON LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS. HE HAS, FOR ANOTHER, GONE THROUGH MUCH OF WHAT THE RIOTING BLACKS OF SOUTH AFRICA ARE PRESENTLY EXPERIENCING BEATING, GASSING AND PRISON. THE REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING'S DEPUTY NEEDS NO INSTRUCTION. UNCLASSIFIED

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"SAID MR. YOUNG AT A HEARING ON THE AFRICAN QUESTION BEFORE MR. CLARK'S AFRICAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE, 'ONE OF THE CRITERIA OF THE LEGITIMACY OF A GOVERNMENT IS WHETHER OR NOT IT SURVIVES WITHOUT RESORTING TO TORTURE. APPLYING THAT STANDARD TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA, IT IS NOT A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT.'

"THE FUTURE RULERS OF SOUTH AFRICA ARE NOW IN PRISON, MR. YOUNG NOTED, AND IF THERE IS TO BE A RATIONAL SOLUTION, IT MUST BE WORKED OUT WITH THEM. 'WORKING WITH VORSTER IS TO HELP STIFLE THE TRUE VOICES OF FREEDOM,' HE SAID.

"MR. YOUNG SEES THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN TERMS. JOHN VORSTER, THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER AND DEVOTEE OF APARTHEID, SEEMS TO HIM LIKE BULL CONNOR, THE SHERIFF AGAINST WHOM HE AND KING SO OFTEN MARCHED - 'THE KIND WHO ARE OPPOSED TO FREEDOM EVEN FOR THEIR OWN PEOPLE.'

"MR. YOUNG, WHOSE OWN NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE WAS CLIMAXED BY HIS ELECTION AS GEORGIA'S FIRST BLACK CONGRESSMAN, IS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE NEW YOUNG BLACK LEADERS OF THE BLACK AFRICAN NATIONS. TANZANIA'S PRESIDENT, J. NYERERE, APPARENTLY WOULD LIKE TO DEMONSTRATE A LITTLE STATESMANSHIP IN THE CURRENT CRISIS.

"SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCY WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO EXTRACT FROM MR. YOUNG AN UNQUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT OF THE KISSINGER MISSION. MR. YOUNG, WHO BELIEVES DEEPLY IN NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS NONCOMMITTAL. HE WASN'T SURE WHETHER MR. KISSINGER WAS WANTED OR COULD DO ANY GOOD.

"MR. PERCY, WHO RETAINS HIS BELIEF IN KISSINGER'S POWERS, ALSO TRIED TO PREVAIL ON MR. YOUNG TO PERSUADE MR. CARTER, IN THE INTERESTS OF BIPARTISANSHIP, TO SUPPORT MR. KISSINGER'S JOURNEY.

"MR. YOUNG REPLIED DIPLOMATICALLY THE TRADITION OF A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY IS VERY STRONG IN THE SOUTH AND MADE GOOD HIS EXIT BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT  
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THE RECORD TO SHOW THAT HE 'PRESUMES' TO BE MR. CARTER'S ADVISER.

"BUT EVERYONE KNOWS THAT MR. YOUNG IS MR. CARTER'S MOST CRUCIAL ALLY, WITH WHITE LIBERALS AS WELL AS BLACKS, AND THAT HE HAS THE CANDIDATE'S EAR.

"HE WAS NOT GOING TO USE MUCH OF HIS INFLUENCE GETTING CARTER TO SPONSOR WHAT SEEMED AT BEST A DUBIOUS ENTERPRISE. WHEN MR. PERCY EARNESTLY SOUGHT HIM TO SPEAK ABOUT THE 'RECEPTIVITY' OF BLACK AFRICA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. MR. YOUNG SAID EVASIVELY THAT WHAT THOSE COUNTRIES WANT IS TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

"I DON'T THINK,' HE ADDED, IN A SMALL DIG AT KISSINGER'S STIFLED EFFORTS TO HELP THE LOSING SIDE IN ANGOLA, 'THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME ANY COVERT OPERATIONS IN AN AROUND THE AREA BY OUR INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS.'

"COLD WAR CONSIDERATIONS ARE THE WRONG PLACE TO START IN DEALING WITH NEW REPUBLICS WE HAVE BELATEDLY DISCOVERED, MR. YOUNG SAID. MOZAMBIQUE, FOR INSTANCE, HAS A MARXIST SYSTEM, BUT NO DESIRE TO BECOME A SOVIET SATELLITE. YET BECAUSE OF OUR DISAPPROVAL, AND SUBSEQUENT REFUSAL TO HELP, WE ARE PUSHING MOZAMBIQUE TO ACCEPT A RUSSIAN NAVAL BASE AND FORCING IT TO GO 'IN A DIRECTION THEY DON'T REALLY WANT TO TAKE.'

"THE MEMBERS TREATED MR. YOUNG WITH THE EXTRAORDINARY DEFERENCE DUE A MAN WHO COULD BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FIGURES IN WASHINGTON, COME NOVEMBER.

"THERE'S NO QUESTION WHOM MR. CARTER WILL SEND WHEN AND IF HE THINKS THE UNITED STATES CAN DO ANYTHING ABOUT THE STORM BREWING IN AFRICA. IT WILL BE ANDREW YOUNG, WHO WOULD START OUT HALFWAY HOME WITH BLACK AFRICANS WITH TEAR GAS IN THEIR CLOTHES."

(3) BALTSUN (TREWITT), "'GRAY AREA' WEAPONS TRANSFORM SALT" -- "WITH THE WHOLE WORLD WATCHING BUT MOSTLY UNAWARE, A HANDFUL OF WEAPONS HAS TRANSFORMED THE ARMS CONTROL DEBATE

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IN A WAY TO CHALLENGE THE ASSUMPTIONS OF A GENERATION. THESE WEAPONS HAVE FROZEN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT). THEY HAVE BLURRED THE FAMILIAR DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOWEVER THEY MAY BE CONSIDERED IN ANOTHER SALT AGREEMENT, THEY WILL LEAVE PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED AS GREAT AS THOSE OF SALT IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

"THEY ARE WHAT PRESIDENT FORD HAS CALLED 'GRAY AREA SYSTEMS.' HENRY KISSINGER, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, ONCE REFERRED TO THEM AS 'HYBRID' WEAPONS. THEIR QUALITIES -- WHETHER THEY ARE STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL, MANAGEABLE OR UNMANAGEABLE -- VARY WITH THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER.

"SOME OF THEIR NAMES ARE FAMILIAR, AT LEAST TO CITIZENS WHO TRY TO FOLLOW A MURKY SUBJECT: AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILES, THE SOVIET BACKFIRE BOMBER, THE SOVIET SS-20 MISSILE. THEIR APPEARANCE WAS A SURPRISE TO NO ONE. WHAT IS NEW IS A GROWING PERCEPTION THAT THEY HAVE ADDED A VAST DIMENSION TO PROBLEMS OF ARMS CONTROL. A QUALITY THEY SHARE IS AMBIGUITY. THEY ARE EITHER STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL WEAPONS ACCORDING TO THEIR FORM OF THE MOMENT, AND THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE.

"THE OLD TERMS JUST DON'T MEAN MUCH ANY LONGER,' SAYS AN AMERICAN SPECIALIST IN ARMS CONTROL. 'I QUIT WORRYING ABOUT THE DISTINCTION A LONG TIME AGO. THE CRUISE MISSILE IS LIKE MOUNT EVEREST, IT'S THERE, WHATEVER IT'S CALLED.' THE OFFICIAL WHO HAS COME CLOSEST TO DEFINING THE PROBLEM IS FRED C. IKLE, THE DIRECTOR OF ACDA. OUTSIDERS HARDLY KNOW WHAT TO MAKE OF MR. IKLE; SOMETIMES HE SOUNDS LIKE A SOFT-LINER AND SOMETIMES LIKE A HARD-LINER IN THE ARMS CONTROL DEBATE. WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THE WEAPONS HE HAD IN MIND, HE DEALT WITH THE GRAY AREA PROBLEM IN AN AUGUST 31 ADDRESS IN LOS ANGELES. SALT ASIDE, HE SAID, THE RUSSIANS WERE AIMING FOR SUPERIORITY IN THE 'REGIONAL NUCLEAR BALANCE.' IT WAS CLEAR, HE CONCLUDED, THAT 'IN THE FUTURE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL CANNOT BE LIMITED TO SO-CALLED STRATEGIC WEAPONS.'

"OFFICIALLY A FORUM EXISTS FOR CONTROLLING REGIONAL, OR TACTICAL, WEAPONS. IT IS THE NEGOTIATION FOR MBFR. IN  
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FACT, MBFR HAS GONE NOWHERE, NOR IS ITS FUTURE BRIGHT. THE DEBATE OVER AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILES AND THE SOVIET BACKFIRE BOMBER HAS RECEIVED WIDESPREAD ATTENTION. THEIR LATE INTRODUCTION INTO SALT HAS MADE A MOCKERY OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN GOAL, REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK IN NOVEMBER 1974 OF A NEW SALT

AGREEMENT LAST YEAR. BUT THE WEAPONS GENERALLY HAVE BEEN TREATED PUBLICLY AS A DEEPLY TROUBLESOME, BUT SUBSIDIARY, ASPECT OF SALT. SOME HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM ALL ALONG. OTHERS, HOWEVER, HAVE PERCEIVED ONLY RECENTLY THAT THE WEAPONS REPRESENT A SEPARATE PROBLEM, POSSIBLY AS GREAT AS THE FUNDAMENTAL, FAMILIAR ISSUES OF SALT.

"CRUISE MISSILES, IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES LEADS TECHNOLOGICALLY, ESSENTIALLY ARE UNMANNED JET AIRCRAFT, IMPROVEMENTS ON THE V-BOMBS OF WORLD WAR II. THEY CAN BE PRODUCED TO CARRY NUCLEAR WARHEADS OR CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES, FOR SHORT- OR LONG-RANGE FLIGHT, WITH NO VISIBLE EXTERNAL CHANGE. THEY POSE OBVIOUS, ENORMOUS VERIFICATION PROBLEMS FOR THE RUSSIANS. SOME STRATEGISTS AND POLITICIANS SUSPECT MR. FORD MAY BE READY TO FORGO DEPLOYMENT ENTIRELY -- IF HE IS ELECTED NOV. 2 -- FOR THE SAKE OF A SALT TREATY. THE PRESIDENT DOUBTLESS KNOWS, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A DECISION WOULD CAUSE HIM GREAT GRIEF FROM THE PENTAGON AND CAPITOL HILL.

"THE SOVIET BACKFIRE IS AN IN-BETWEEN BOMBER. SOME SUSPECT THAT THE U.S. SEIZED UPON IT ARTIFICIALLY TO COUNTER SOVIET ARGUMENTS AGAINST CRUISE MISSILES. BUT EVEN SOME SPECIALISTS ENTHUSIASTIC FOR ARMS CONTROL SAY NO -- THAT THE POTENTIAL OF THE BACKFIRE IS AMBIGUOUS ENOUGH TO MAKE IT A TRUE GRAY AREA WEAPON. LITTLE PUBLIC ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID TO THE SOVIET SS-20 IN THE BROADER DISCUSSION. NOW IN EARLY DEPLOYMENT, OR READY FOR DEPLOYMENT, IT IS A MOBILE, TWO-STAGE MISSILE WHICH CAN CARRY SEVERAL WARHEADS. ITS RANGE FALLS JUST BENEATH THE MAXIMUM THAT WOULD FORCE ITS INCLUSION UNDER SALT CEILINGS. OBVIOUSLY IT IS A TROUBLESOME WEAPON FOR THE U.S. AS IT STANDS. WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES AGAINST WHOM IT IS TARGETED REGARD IT AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON IN ITS PRIMARY FORM. BUT THE LARGER PROBLEM IN THE SS-20 FOR THE U.S. IS ITS POTENTIAL FOR UNCLASSIFIED

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CONVERSION. WITH ANOTHER ROCKET STAGE, IT BECOMES A LONG-RANGE WEAPON -- THE SS-16, WHICH IS DECIDEDLY A SALT ITEM. SPECIALISTS SAY THE CONVERSION IS PROBABLY NOT QUICK OR EASY -- 'IT'S NOT LIKE PUTTING ON A HAT,' ONE REMARKED. BUT THE POTENTIAL FOR CHEATING, THEY AGREE, IS A CONSIDERATION.

"OUTSIDERS HAVE ASSUMED THAT RECENT DELAYS IN SALT MAY BE ATTRIBUTED IN PART TO MR. FORD'S AVOIDANCE OF A PRE-ELECTION FLAP. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AGREE PRIVATELY THAT POLITICS IS A CONSIDERATION. SPECIALISTS SAY THE PROBLEM IS LARGER THAN THAT, HOWEVER, WHETHER OR NOT MR. FORD APPRECIATES IT."  
ROBINSON

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